verba usitata
Atque hinc porro clare intelligimus cur mens ex cogitatione unius rei statim in alterius rei cogitationem incidat quæ nullam cum priore habet similitudinem; ut exempli gratia ex cogitatione vocis pomi homo romanus statim in cogitationem fructus incidet qui nullam cum articulato illo sono habet similitudinem nec aliquid commune nisi quod ejusdem hominis corpus ab his duobus affectum sæpe fuit hoc est quod ipse homo sæpe vocem pomum audivit dum ipsum fructum videret et sic unusquisque ex una in aliam cogitationem incidet prout rerum imagines uniuscujusque consuetudo in corpore ordinavit.
And hence we further clearly understand why the mind passes instantaneously from the idea of one thing to that of another which has no resemblance to the former; as, for example, on thinking of the word pomum a Roman immediately thought of a fruit, which has no resemblance to that articulate sound, nor anything in common with it, except that the body of the same man was often simultaneously affected by these two things, i.e., that the same man often heard the word pomum when he saw the fruit; and thus each man passes from one thought to another, according to the order which habit has given to the images of things in his body.
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Zu zagen “Ich habe Lust auf einen Apfel” heißt nichts: Ich glaube, ein Apfel wird mein Gefühl der Unbefriedigung stillen. Dieser Satz ist keine Äußerung des Wunsches, sondern der Unbefriedigung.
Saying “I’d like an apple” does not mean: I belive an apple will quell my feeling of non-satisfaction. This utterance is an expression not of a wish but of non-satisfaction.